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individuals she imagines becoming. If we maintain a distinction between identity and outcome lotteries
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1 Introduction
This paper revisits Harsanyis (1953, 1955, 1977) utilitarian impartial observer theorem. Consider
a society of individuals I: The society has to choose among di¤erent social policies, each of which
induces a probability distribution or lottery` over a set of social outcomes X . Each individual i
has preferences %i over these lotteries. These preferences are known, and they di¤er.
To help choose among social policies, Harsanyi proposed that each individual should imagine
herself as an impartial observer who does not know which person she will be. That is, the
impartial observer faces not only the real lottery ` over the social outcomes in X , but also a
hypothetical lottery z over which identity in I she will assume. In forming preferences % over all
such extended lotteries, an impartial observer is forced to make interpersonal comparisons: for
example, she is forced to compare being person i in social state x with being person j in social
state x0.
Harsanyi assumed the so-called acceptance principle; that is, when an impartial observer
imagines herself being person i she adopts person is preferences over the outcome lotteries. He
also assumed that all individuals are expected utility maximizers, and that they continue to be so in
the role of the impartial observer. Harsanyi argued that these Bayesian rationalityaxioms force
the impartial observer to be a (weighted) utilitarian. More formally, over all extended lotteries
(z; `) in which the identity lottery and the outcome lotteries are independently distributed, the
impartial observers preferences admit a representation of the form
V (z; `) =
X
i
ziUi (`) (1)
where zi is the probability of assuming person is identity and Ui (`) :=
R
Xui (x) ` (dx) is person is
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility for the outcome lottery `. Where no confusion arises,
we will omit the weightedand refer to the representation in (1) simply as utilitarianism.1
1 Some writers (e.g., Sen 1970, 1977; Weymark 1991, Mongin 2001, 2002) reserve the term utilitarianism for
social welfare functions in which all the zis are equal and the Uis are welfares not just von-Neumann Morgenstern
utilities. Harsanyi claims that impartial observers should assess social policies using equal zi weights, and that
von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities should be identied with welfares. Harsanyi (1977, pp. 57-60) concedes that
his axioms do not force all potential impartial observers to agree in their extended preferences. Nevertheless, he
claims that, given enough information about the individualspsychological, biological and cultural characteristics
all impartial observers would agree. These extra claims are not the focus of this paper, but we will return to the
issues of agreement and welfare in section 7.
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Harsanyis utilitarianism has attracted many criticisms. We confront just two: one concerning
fairness; and one concerning di¤erent attitudes toward risk. To illustrate both criticisms, consider
two individuals, i and j and two social outcomes xi and xj . Person i strictly prefers outcome xi
to outcome xj , but person j strictly prefers xj to xi. Perhaps, there is some (possibly indivisible)
good, and xi is the state in which person i gets the good while xj is the state in which person j
gets it. Suppose that an impartial observer would be indi¤erent between being person i in state
xi and being person j in state xj ; hence ui (xi) = uj (xj) =: uH . She is also indi¤erent between
being i in xj and being j in xi; hence ui (xj) = uj (xi) =: uL. And she strictly prefers the rst
pair (having the good) to the second (not having the good); hence uH > uL.
The concern about fairness is similar to Diamonds (1967) critique of Harsanyis aggregation
theorem. Consider the two extended lotteries illustrated in tables (a) and (b) in which rows are
the people and columns are the outcomes.
xi xj xi xj
i 1=2 0 i 1=4 1=4
j 1=2 0 j 1=4 1=4
(a) (b)
In each, the impartial observer has a half chance of being person i or person j. But in table (a),
the good is simply given outright to person i: outcome xi has probability 1. In table (b), the good
is allocated by tossing a coin: the outcomes xi and xj each have probability 1=2. Diamond argued
that a fair-minded person might prefer the second allocation policy since it gives each person a
fair shake.2 But Harsanyis utilitarian impartial observer is indi¤erent to such considerations
of fairness. Each policy (or its associated extended lottery) involves a half chance of getting the
good and hence yields the impartial observer 12u
H+ 12u
L. The impartial observer cares only about
her total chance of getting the good, not how this chance is distributed between person i and j.
The concern about di¤erent risk attitudes is less familiar.3 Consider the two extended lotteries
2 Societies often use both simple lotteries and weighted lotteries to allocate goods (and bads), presumably for
fairness considerations. Examples include the draft, kidney machines, oversubscribed events, schools, and public
housing, and even whom should be thrown out of a lifeboat! For a long list and an enlightening discussion, see
Elster (1989).
3 Pattanaik (1968) remarks that in reducing an identity-outcome lottery to a one-stage lottery, what we are
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illustrated in tables (c) and (d).
xi xj xi xj
i 1=2 1=2 i 0 0
j 0 0 j 1=2 1=2
(c) (d)
In each, the impartial observer has a half chance of being in state xi or state xj , and hence a
half chance of getting the good. But in (c), the impartial observer faces this risk as person i,
while in (d), she faces the risk as person j. Suppose that person i is more comfortable facing
such a risk than is person j.4 But Harsanyis utilitarian impartial observer is indi¤erent to such
considerations of risk attitude. Each of the extended lotteries (c) and (d) again yield 12u
H + 12u
L.
Thus, Harsanyis impartial observer does not care who faces this risk.
In his own response to the concern about fairness, Harsanyi (1975) argued that, even if ran-
domizations were of value for promoting fairness (which he doubted), any explicit randomization
is superuous since the great lottery of (pre-)lifemay be viewed as having already given each
child an equal chance of being each individual. That is, for Harsanyi, it does not matter whether
a good is allocated by a (possibly imaginary) lottery over identities as in table (a) above, or by
a (real) lottery over outcomes as in table (c), or by some combination of the two as in table (b).
The dispute about fairness thus seems to rest on whether or not we are indeed indi¤erent between
identity and outcome lotteries; that is, between accidents of birthand real life chances. For
Harsanyi, they are equivalent, but, for those concerned about fairness, genuinelife chances might
be preferred to mereaccidents of birth.5
If we regard outcome and identity lotteries as equivalent, there is little scope left to accommo-
date di¤erent risk attitudes of di¤erent individuals. For example, the outcome lottery in table (c)
actually doing is to combine attitudes to risk of more than one person (pp. 1165-6).
4 To make this notion of greater comfort concrete, suppose that both people have certainty equivalents for
the risk of a half chance of being in states xi or xj call these certainty equivalents yi and yj respectively and
suppose that, according to the interpersonal comparisons of the impartial observer, person j is prepared to give up
more than person i to remove this risk: that is, the impartial observer would prefer to be person i with yi than
person j with yj . In this case, by the denition of a certainty equivalent, the acceptance principle and transitivity,
the impartial observer would prefer to face the risk of a half chance of being in states xi or xj as person i than as
person j.
5 This could be seen as an example of what Ergin & Gul (2009) call issue or source preference.
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would be indi¤erent to the identity lottery in table (a) even though the risk in the rst is faced
by person i and the risk in the second is faced by the impartial observer. Similarly, the outcome
lottery in (d) would be indi¤erent to the identity lottery in (a). Hence the two outcome lotteries
(c) and (d) must be indi¤erent even though one is faced by person i and the other by person j.
In e¤ect, indi¤erence between outcome and identity lotteries treats all risks as if they were faced
by one agent, the impartial observer: it forces us to conate the risk attitudes of individuals with
those of the impartial observer herself. But Harsanyis own acceptance principle states that, when
the impartial observer imagines herself as person i, she should adopt person is preferences over
the outcome lotteries faced by person i. This suggests that di¤erent lotteries perhaps should not
be treated as equivalent if they are faced by di¤erent people with possibly di¤erent risk attitudes.
We want to make explicit the possibility that an impartial observer might distinguish between
the identity lotteries 4 (I) she faces and the outcome lotteries 4 (X ) faced by the indviduals.
Harsanyis impartial observer is assumed to form preferences over the entire set of joint distribu-
tions 4 (I  X ) over identities and outcomes. In such a set up, it is hard to distinguish outcome
from identity lotteries since the resolution of identity can partially or fully resolve the outcome.
For example, the impartial observer could face a joint distribution in which, if she becomes person
i then society holds the outcome lottery `, but if she becomes person j then social outcome x
obtains for sure. To keep this distinction clean, we restrict attention to product lotteries, 4 (I)
4 (X ). That is, the impartial observer only forms preferences over extended lotteries in which
the outcome lottery she faces is the same regardless of which identity she assumes. That said,
our restriction to product lotteries is for conceptual clarity only and is not essential for the main
results.6
Harsanyis assumption that identity and outcome lotteries are equivalent is implicit. Suppose
that, without imposing such an equivalence, we impose each of Harsanyis three main assump-
tions: that, if the impartial observer imagines being individual i, she accepts the preferences of
that individual; that each individual satises independence over the lotteries he faces (which are
outcome lotteries); and that the impartial observer satises independence over the lotteries she
6 See section 6 below.
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faces (which are identity lotteries). Notice that, by acceptance, the impartial observer inherits
independence over outcome lotteries. But this is not enough to force us to the (weighted) util-
itarianism of expression 1. Instead (theorem 1), we obtain a generalized (weighted) utilitarian
representation:
V (z; `) =
X
i
zii (Ui (`)) (2)
where zi is again the probability of assuming person is identity and Ui (`) is again person is
expected utility from the outcome lottery `, but each i (:) is a (possibly non-linear) transformation
of person is expected utility. Generalized utilitarianism is well known to welfare economists, but
has not before been given foundations in the impartial-observer framework.7
Generalized utilitarianism can accommodate concerns about fairness if the i-functions are
concave.8 Harsanyis utilitarianism can be thought of as the special case where each i is a¢ ne.
The discussion above suggests that these di¤erences about fairness involve preferences between
identity and outcome lotteries. The framework allows us to formalize this intuition: we show
that a generalized utilitarian impartial observer has concave i-functions if and only if she has
a preference for outcome lotteries over identity lotteries (i.e., a preference for life chances); and
she is a utilitarian if and only if she is indi¤erent between outcome and identity lotteries (i.e.,
indi¤erent between life chances and accidents of birth).9
Generalized utilitarianism can accommodate concerns about di¤erent risk attitudes simply by
allowing the i-functions to di¤er in their degree of concavity or convexity.
10 In the example above,
the impartial observer rst assessed equal welfares to being person i in state xi or person j in state
xj , and equal welfares to being i in xj or j in xi. The issue of di¤erent risk attitudes seemed to
7 For example, see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005, chapter 4) and Blackorby, Donaldson & Mongin
(2004). Both obtain similar representations for aggregating utility vectors; the former from Gorman-like separability
assumptions, the latter by assuming consistency between evaluations based on the ex post social welfares and those
based on ex ante utilities. See also Blackorby, Donaldson & Weymark (1999).
8 In our story, we have i (ui (xi)) = j (uj (xj)) > i (ui (xj)) = j (uj (xi)). Thus, if the -functions
are (strictly) concave, the impartial observer evaluatation of allocation policy (c) i
 
1
2
ui (xi) +
1
2
ui (xj)

>
1
2
i (ui (xi)) +
1
2
i (ui (xj)) =
1
2
i (ui (xi)) +
1
2
j (uj (xi)), her evaluation of policy (a). The argument comparing
(b) and (a) is similar.
9 This provides a new axiomatization of Harsanyis utilitarianism, distinct from, for example, Karni & Weymark
(1998) or Safra & Weissengrin (2003).
10 For example, if i is strictly concave but j is linear, then the impartial observers evaluation of policy (c)
i
 
1
2
ui (xi) +
1
2
ui (xj)

> 1
2
i (ui (xi))+
1
2
i (ui (xj)) =
1
2
j (uj (xj))+
1
2
j (uj (xi)) = j
 
1
2
uj (xj) +
1
2
uj (xi)

,
her evaluation of policy (d).
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rest on whether such equal welfaresimplies equal von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities. We show
that a generalized utilitarian impartial observer uses the same -function for all people (implying
the same mapping from their von-Neumann Morgenstern utilities to her welfare assessments) if
and only if she would be indi¤erent as to which person to be when facing such similar risks.
Where does Harsanyi implicitly assume both indi¤erence between life chances and accidents of
births and indi¤erence between individuals facing similar risks? Harsanyis independence axiom
goes further than ours in two ways. First, in our case, the impartial observer inherits indepen-
dence over outcome lotteries indirectly (via acceptance) from individualspreferences. In contrast,
Harsanyis axiom imposes independence over outcome lotteries directly on the impartial observer.
We will see that this direct imposition forces the impartial observer to be indi¤erent as to which
individual faces similar risks. Second, Harsanyis independence axiom extends to randomizations
that simultaneously mix outcome and identity lotteries. We will see that this assumption forces
the impartial observer to be indi¤erent between these two types of randomization, and this in turn
precludes concern for fairness.
Earlier attempts to accommodate fairness considerations focussed on dropping independence.
For example, Karni & Safra (2002) relax independence for the individual preferences, while Ep-
stein & Segal (1992) relax independence for the impartial observer.11 Our approach maintains
independence for each agent but restricts its domain to the lotteries faced by that agent.
Section 2 sets up the framework. Section 3 axiomatizes generalized utilitarianism. Section 4
deals with concerns about fairness. We show that the impartial observer ignoring these concerns
is equivalent to her being indi¤erent between identity and outcome lotteries. This yields a new
axiomatization of Harsanyis utilitarianism. Section 5 deals with concerns about di¤erent risk
attitudes. Section 6 rst shows how to extend our analysis to the entire set of joint distributions
4 (I  X ) over identities and outcomes. We then show how Harsanyis independence axiom
restricted to our domain of product lotteries, 4 (I)  4 (X ), implies both our independence
axiom and both our indi¤erence conditions: indi¤erence between outcome and identity lotteries,
11 Strictly speaking, Epstein & Segals paper is in the context of Harsanyis (1955) aggregation theorem. In
addition, Broome (1991) addresses fairness concerns by expanding the outcome space to include the means of
allocation (e.g., the use of a physical randomization device) as part of the description of the nal outcome.
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and indi¤erence as to whom faces similar risks. Section 7 considers four possible views (including
the one taken in this paper) for the role of the impartial observer. For each view we ask: what are
the knowledge requirements for the impartial observer; and must all potential impartial observers
agree in their preferences over extended lotteries; and we relate these to the issues of fairness and
di¤erent risk attitudes. Proofs are in the appendix. Appendix B [on line] contains supplementary
examples and proofs.
2 Set up and Notation
Let society consist of a nite set of individuals I = f1; : : : ; Ig, I  2, with generic elements i and
j. The set of social outcomes is denoted by X with generic element x. The set X is assumed
to have more than one element and to be a compact metrizable space and associated with it is
the set of events E , which is taken to be the Borel sigma-algebra of X . Let 4 (X ) (with generic
element `) denote the set of outcome lotteries; that is the set of probability measures on (X ; E)
endowed with the weak convergence topology. These lotteries represent the risks actually faced by
each individual in their lives. With slight abuse of notation, we will let x or sometimes [x] denote
the degenerate outcome lottery that assigns probability weight 1 to social state x.
Each individual i in I, is endowed with a preference relation %i dened over the set of life-
chances4 (X ). We assume throughout that for each i in I, the preference relation%i is a complete,
transitive binary relation on 4 (X ), and that its asymmetric part i is non-empty. We assume
these preferences are continuous in that weak upper and weak lower contour sets are closed. Hence
for each %i there exists a non-constant function Vi : 4 (X ) ! R, satisfying for any ` and `0 in
4 (X ), Vi (`)  Vi (`0) if and only if ` %i `0. In summary, a society may be characterized by the
tuple

X ; I; f%igi2I.
In Harsanyis story, the impartial observer imagines herself behind a veil of ignorance, uncertain
about which identity she will assume in the given society. Let 4 (I) denote the set of identity
lotteries on I. Let z denote the typical element of4 (I), and let zi denote the probability assigned
by the identity lottery z to individual i. These lotteries represent the imaginary risks in the mind
of the impartial observer of being born as someone else. With slight abuse of notation, we will let
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i or sometimes [i] denote the degenerate identity lottery that assigns probability weight 1 to the
impartial observer assuming the identity of individual i.
As discussed above, we assume that the outcome and identity lotteries faced by the impartial
observer are independently distributed; that is, she faces a product lottery (z; `) 2 4 (I)4 (X ).
We shall sometimes refer to this as a product identity-outcome lottery or, where no confusion
arises, simply as a product lottery.
Fix an impartial observer endowed with a preference relation % dened over4 (I)4 (X ). We
assume throughout that % is complete, transitive continuous (in that weak upper and weak lower
contour sets are closed in the product topology), and that its asymmetric part  is non-empty,
and so it admits a (non-trivial) continuous representation V : 4 (I) 4 (X ) ! R. That is, for
any pair of product lotteries, (z; `) and (z0; `0), (z; `) % (z0; `0) if and only if V (z; `)  V (z0; `0).
Utilitarianism We say that the impartial observer is a (weighted) utilitarian if her preferences
% admit a representation

fUigi2I of the form
V (z; `) =
IX
i=1
ziUi(`)
where, for each individual i in I, Ui : 4 (X )! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-
utility representation of %i; i.e., Ui (`) :=
Z
X
ui (x) ` (dx).
Generalized Utilitarianism We say that the impartial observer is a generalized (weighted)
utilitarian if her preferences % admit a representation

fUi; igi2I of the form
V (z; `) =
IX
i=1
zii [Ui(`)] .
where, for each individual i in I, i : R ! R is a continuous, increasing function, and
Ui : 4 (X )! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility representation of %i.
3 Generalized Utilitarianism
In this section, we axiomatize generalized utiltiarianism. The rst axiom is Harsanyis acceptance
principle. In degenerate product lotteries of the form (i; `) or (i; `0), the impartial observer knows
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she will assume identity i for sure. The acceptance principle requires that, in this case, the im-
partial observers preferences % must coincide with that individuals preferences %i over outcome
lotteries.
Acceptance Principle. For all i in I and all `; `0 2 4 (X ), ` %i `0 if and only if (i; `) % (i; `0).
Second, we assume that each individual is preferences satisfy the independence axiom for the
lotteries he faces; i.e., outcome lotteries.
Independence over Outcome Lotteries (for Individual i). Suppose `, `0 2 4 (X ) are such
that ` i `0. Then, for all ~`, ~`0 2 4 (X ), ~`%i ~`0 if and only if ~`+(1  ) ` %i ~`0+(1  ) `0
for all  in (0; 1].
Third, we assume that the impartial observers preferences satisfy independence for the lotteries
she faces; i.e., identity lotteries. Here, however, we need to be careful. The set of product lotteries
4 (I)  4 (X ) is not a convex subset of 4 (I  X ) and hence not all probability mixtures of
product lotteries are well dened. Thus, we adopt the following notion of independence.12
Independence over Identity Lotteries (for the Impartial Observer). Suppose (z; `), (z0; `0)
2 4 (I)4 (X ) are such that (z; `)  (z0; `0). Then, for all ~z, ~z0 2 4(I):(~z; `) % (~z0; `0) if
and only if (~z + (1  ) z; `) % (~z0 + (1  ) z0; `0) for all  in (0; 1].
To understand this axiom, rst notice that the two mixtures on the right side of the implication
are identical to (~z; `)+(1  ) (z; `) and (~z0; `0)+(1  ) (z0; `0) respectively. These two mixtures
of product lotteries are well dened: they mix identity lotteries holding the outcome lottery xed.
Second, notice that the two product lotteries, (z; `) and (z0; `0), that are mixed inwith weight
(1  ) are themselves indi¤erent. The axiom states that mixing in two indi¤erent lotteries
(with equal weight) preserves the the original preference between (~z; `) and (~z0; `0) prior to mixing.
Finally, notice that this axiom only applies to mixtures of identity lotteries holding the outcome
12 This axiom is based on Fishburns (1982, p. 88) and Safra & Weissengrins (2003) substitution axioms for
product lottery spaces. Their axioms, however, apply wherever probability mixtures are well dened in this space.
We only allow mixtures of identity lotteries. In this respect, our axiom is similar to Karni & Safras (2000)
constrained independenceaxiom, but their axiom applies to all joint distributions over identities and outcomes,
not just to product lotteries.
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lotteries xed, not to the opposite case: mixtures of outcome lotteries holding the identity lotteries
xed.
To obtain our representation results, we work with a richness condition on the domain of
individual preferences: we assume that none of the outcome lotteries under consideration are
Pareto dominated.
Absence of Unanimity For all `; `0 2 4 (X ) if ` i `0 for some i in I then there exists j in
I such that `0 j `.
This condition is perhaps a natural restriction in the context of Harsanyis thought experiment.
That exercise is motivated by the need to make social choices when agents disagree. We do not
need to imagine ourselves as an impartial observer facing a identity lottery to rule out social
alternatives that are Pareto dominated.13
These axioms are enough to yield a generalized utilitarian representation.
Theorem 1 (Generalized Utilitarianism) Suppose that absence of unanimity applies. Then
the impartial observers preferences % admit a generalized utilitarian representation

fUi; igi2I
if and only if the impartial observer satises the acceptance principle and independence over iden-
tity lotteries, and each individual satises independence over outcome lotteries.
Moreover the functions Ui are unique up to positive a¢ ne transformations and the composite
functions i  Ui are unique up to a common positive a¢ ne transformation.
Grant et al. (2006: theorem 8) show that without absence of unanimity, we still obtain a general-
ized utilitarian representation but we lose the uniqueness of the composite functions iUi. Notice
that, while the representation of each individuals preferences Ui is a¢ ne in outcome lotteries, in
general, the representation of the impartial observers preferences V is not.
13 In Harsanyis thought experiment, Pareto dominated lotteries would never be chosen by the impartial observer
since the combination of the acceptance principle and Harsanyis stronger independence axioms imply the Pareto
criterion. We are grateful to a referee for this point.
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4 Fairness or ex ante egalitarianism
So far we have placed no restriction on the shape of the i-functions except that they are increasing.
In a standard utilitarian social welfare function, each ui-function maps individual is income to
an individual utility. These incomes di¤er across people, and concavity of the ui-functions is
associated with egalitarianism over incomes. In a generalized utilitarian social welfare function,
each i-function maps individual is expected utility Ui (`) to a utility of the impartial observer.
These expected utilities di¤er across people, and concavity of the i-functions is associated with
egalitarianism over expected utilities, often called ex ante egalitarianism.14
We will show that concavity of the i-functions is equivalent to an axiom that generalizes the
example in the introduction. The example involved two indi¤erence sets of the impartial observer,
that containing (i; xi) and (j; xj) and that containing (i; xj) and (j; xi). We argued that a pref-
erence for fairness corresponds to preferring a randomization between these indi¤erence sets in
outcome lotteries to a randomization in identity lotteries. To generalize, suppose the impartial
observer is indi¤erent between (z; `0) and (z0; `), and consider the product lottery (z; `) that (in
general) lies in a di¤erent indi¤erence set. There are two ways to randomize between these indif-
ference sets while remaining in the set of product lotteries. The product lottery (z; `+ (1  ) `0)
randomizes between these indi¤erence sets in outcome lotteries (i.e., real life chances); while the
product lottery (z + (1  ) z0; `) randomizes between these indi¤erence sets in identity lotteries
(i.e., imaginary accidents of birth).
Preference for Life Chances. For any pair of identity lotteries z and z0 in 4 (I), and any
pair of outcome lotteries ` and `0 in 4 (X ), if (z; `0)  (z0; `) then (z; `+ (1  ) `0) %
(z + (1  ) z0; `) for all  in (0; 1).
If we add this axiom to the conditions of Theorem 1, then we obtain concave generalized
utilitarianism.
14 See for example, Broome (1984), Myerson (1981), Hammond (1981, 1982) and Meyer (1991). In our context,
it is perhaps better to call this interimegalitarianism since it refers to distributions after the resolution of the
identity lottery but beforethe resolution of the outcome lottery. We can contrast this with a concern for ex post
inequality of individualswelfare, see for example Fleurbaey (2007).
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Proposition 2 (Concavity) Suppose that absence of unanimity applies. A generalized utilitar-
ian impartial observer with representation

fUi; igi2I exhibits preference for life chances if and
only if each of the i-functions is concave.
This result does rely on there being some richness in the underlying preferences so that preference
for life chances has bite. In particular, example 2 in the supplementary appendix shows that, if
all agents agree in their ranking of all outcome lotteries then the is need not be concave. This
is ruled out in the proposition by absence of unanimity.
As discussed, Harsanyi treats identity and outcome lotteries as equivalent. Hence he implicitly
imposes the following indi¤erence.
Indi¤erence between Life Chances and Accidents of Birth. For any pair of identity lot-
teries z and z0 in 4 (I), and any pair of outcome lotteries ` and `0 in 4 (X ), if (z; `0) 
(z0; `) then (z; `+ (1  ) `0)  (z + (1  ) z0; `) for all  in (0; 1).
This is a very strong assumption. If we impose this indi¤erence as an explicit axiom then, as
a corollary of Proposition 2, we obtain that each i-function must be a¢ ne. In this case, if we let
U^i := i  Ui, then U^i is itself a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility representation of %i.
Thus, we immediately obtain Harsanyis utilitarian representation.
But, in fact, we obtain a stronger result. This indi¤erence over the type of randomization
allows us to dispense with the independence axiom over outcome lotteries for the individuals.
Theorem 3 (Utilitarianism) Suppose that absence of unanimity applies. The impartial ob-
servers preferences % admit a utilitarian representation

fUigi2I if and only if the impartial
observer satises the acceptance principle, independence over identity lotteries, and is indi¤erent
between life chances and accidents of birth.
Moreover the functions Ui are unique up to common positive a¢ ne transformations.
Standard proofs of Harsanyis utilitarianism directly impose stronger notions of indepen-
dence.15 For example:
15 See section 6 for details.
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Independence over Outcome Lotteries (for the Impartial Observer). Suppose (z; `), (z0; `0)
2 4 (I)4 (X ) are such that (z; `)  (z0; `0). Then for all ~`, ~`0 2 4(X ): (z; ~`) % (z0; ~`0) if
and only if (z; ~`+ (1  a) `) % (z0; ~`0 + (1  a) `0) for all  in (0; 1].
This axiom is the symmetric analog of identity independence for the impartial observer reversing
the roles of identity lotteries and outcome lotteries. Clearly, if the impartial observer satises this
independence then it would be redundant for her to inherit independence over outcome lotteries
from individual preferences; and moreover, given acceptance, this independence for the impartial
observer imposes independence on the individuals. We do not directly impose independence over
outcome lotteries on the impartial observer, but our axioms imply it.
Corollary 4 Suppose that absence of unanimity applies. Then the impartial observer satises in-
dependence over outcome lotteries if she satises acceptance, independence over identity lotteries,
and is indi¤erent between life chances and accidents of birth.
To summarize: What separates Harsanyi from those generalized utilitarian impartial observers
who are ex ante egalitarians are their preferences between outcome and identity lotteries. If the
impartial observer prefers outcome lotteries, she is an ex ante egalitarian. If she is indi¤erent (like
Harsanyi) then she is a utilitarian. Moreover, indi¤erence between outcome and identity lotteries
forces the generalized utilitarian to accept stronger notions of independence.
5 Di¤erent risk attitudes
Recall that an impartial observers interpersonal welfare comparisons might rank (i; xi)  (j; xj)
and (i; xj)  (j; xi), but if person i is more comfortable facing risk than person j, she might rank 
i; 12 [xi] +
1
2 [xj ]
   j; 12 [xi] + 12 [xj ]. Harsanyis utilitarianism rules this out.
An analogy might be useful. In the standard representative-agent model of consumption
over time, each time period is assigned one utility function. This utility function must reect
both risk aversion in that period and substitutions between periods. Once utilities are scaled for
inter-temporal welfare comparisons, there is limited scope to accommodate di¤erent risk attitudes
across periods. Harsanyis utilitarian impartial observer assigns one utility function per person.
13
This utility function must reect both the risk aversion of that person and substitutions between
people. Once utilities are scaled for interpersonal welfare comparisons, there is limited scope to
accommodate di¤erent risk attitudes across people.
Given this analogy, it is not surprising that generalized utilitarianism can accommodate dif-
ferent risk attitudes. Each person is now assigned two functions, i and ui, so we can separate
interpersonal welfare comparisons from risk aversion.
To be more precise, we rst generalize the example in the introduction.
Similar Risks Suppose the impartial observer assesses (i; `)  (j; `0) and (i; ~`)  (j; ~`0). Then,
for all  in (0; 1), the two outcome lotteries ~`+ (1  ) ` and ~`0 + (1  ) `0 are similar
risks for individuals i and j respectively.
These risks are similar for i and j in that they are across outcome lotteries that the impartial
observer has assessed to have equal welfare for individuals i and j respectively. If individual j is
more risk averse than individual i, then we might expect the impartial observer to prefer to face
these similar risks as person i.
Preference to Face Similar Risks as i rather than j Fix a pair of individuals i and j in I.
The impartial observer is said to prefer to face similar risks as indivdiual i rather than as
individual j, if any four outcome lotteries `,`0,~` and ~`0 in 4 (X ), such that (i; `)  (j; `0)
and (i; ~`)  (j; ~`0) then,

i,~`+ (1  ) `

%

j,~`0 + (1  ) `0

for all  in [0; 1].
Recall that agent j is more income risk averse than agent i if the function uj that maps income
to agent js von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is a concave transformation of that function ui
for agent i; that is, ui  u 1j is convex. For each i, the function  1i maps the utilities of the
impartial observer (used in her interpersonal welfare comparisons) to agent is von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility. Thus, if agent j is more (welfare) risk averse than agent i then  1j is a
concave transformation of  1i ; that is, 
 1
i j is convex everywhere where they are comparable.
The next proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 5 (Di¤erent Risk Attitudes.) Suppose that absence of unanimity applies. A
generalized utilitarian impartial observer with representation

fUi; igi2I always prefers to face
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similar risks as i rather than j if and only if the composite function  1i  j is convex on the the
domain Uji := fu 2 R : there exists `; `0 2 4 (X ) with (i; `)  (j; `0) and Uj (`0) = ug.
Next consider indi¤erence as to which individual should face similar risks.
Indi¤erence between Individuals facing Similar Risks. For any pair of individuals i and
j in I and any four outcome lotteries `,`0,~` and ~`0 in 4 (X ), if (i; `)  (j; `0) and (i; ~`) 
(j; ~`0) then, for all  in [0; 1], the impartial observer is indi¤erent between facing the similar
risks ~`+ (1  ) ` and ~`0 + (1  ) `0 as individual i or j respectively.
Harsanyis utilitarian impartial observer satises this indi¤erence: it is an immediate conse-
quence of independence over outcome lotteries for the impartial observer. But we can imagine
an impartial observer who, without necessarily satisfying all of Harsanyis axioms, is nevertheless
indi¤erent as to which individual should face similar risks. For example, consider an impartial ob-
server in the analog of a representative-agentmodel. In the standard representative-agent model,
all individuals have the same preferences over private consumption and the same attitude to risk.
In our setting, we must allow individuals to have di¤erent preferences over public outcomes.16
But, as in the standard representative-agent model, we could assume that each individual had the
same risk attitude across outcome lotteries that had been assessed to have equal welfare. This is
precisely the indi¤erence property above.
Given Proposition 5, for any two individuals i and j, indi¤erence between individuals facing
similar risks forces the i and j-functions to be identical up to positive a¢ ne transformations
provided Uji has a non-empty interior. Hence:
Proposition 6 (Common -Function) Suppose that absence of unanimity applies and con-
sider a generalized utilitarian impartial observer. There exists a generalized utilitarian represen-
tation

fUi; igi2I with i =  for all i in I if and only if the impartial observer is indi¤erent
between individuals facing similar risks.
Moreover, if for any pair of individuals i and j in I, there exists a sequence of individuals
j1 : : : jN with j1 = i and jN = j such that Ujnjn 1 has non-empty interior then the functions Ui
16 For example, public outcome xi might allocate an indivisible good to person i, while xj might allocate it to
person j.
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are unique up to a common positive a¢ ne transformation, and the composite functions  Ui are
unique up to a common positive a¢ ne transformation.
To compare results, a generalized utilitarian impartial observer who is not concerned about
the issue of di¤erent individual risk attitudes (and hence satises indi¤erence between individuals
facing similar risks) need not be a utilitarian. She need only translate individualsvon Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities using a common -function when making welfare comparisons across those
individuals. Hence such an impartial observer can accommodate issues of fairness: in particular,
the common -function might be concave.
In contrast, a generalized utilitarian impartial observer who is not concerned about issues of
fairness (and hence satises indi¤erence between life chances and accidents of birth) must be a
utilitarian. Hence such an impartial observer cannot accommodate the issue of di¤erent individual
risk attitudes.
To see this directly, recall that independence over outcome lotteries for the impartial observer
immediately implies indi¤erence between individuals facing similar risks. And, by corollary 4,
for a generalized utilitarian impartial observer, indi¤erence between life chances and accidents of
birth implies independence over outcome lotteries for the impartial observer.
Consideration of di¤erent risk aversions and consideration of fairness are distinct issues and
they may lead an impartial observer in opposite directions. For example, suppose that all indi-
viduals are extremely risk averse over outcome lotteries, but that the impartial observer is almost
risk neutral over identity lotteries. This impartial observer, anticipating the real discomfort that
outcome lotteries would cause people, might prefer to absorb the risk into the imaginary identity
lottery of her thought experiment. That is, she might prefer a society in which most uncertainty
has been resolved and hence people would know their fatesby the time they were born.
Such an impartial observer would prefer accidents of birth to life chances: she would be an ex
ante anti-egalitarian.
16
6 Contrasting Independences and Domains
Recall that Harsanyi works with the full set of joint distributions 4 (I  X ), not just the prod-
uct lotteries 4 (I)4 (X ). He imposes independence directly on the impartial observer for all
mixtures dened on that domain. In this section, we rst consider the natural extensions of our
axioms for the impartial observer in the larger domain 4 (I  X ). Second, we consider restrict-
ing Harsanyis original independence axiom dened on 4 (I  X ) to the set of product lotteries
4 (I)4 (X ). Third, we discuss whether imposing identity and outcome independence directly
on the impartial observer is enough to induce utilitarianism.
6.1 The full set of joint distributions.
Suppose that the impartial observer has preferences over the full space of joint distributions over
identities and outcomes, 4 (I  X ). With slight abuse of notation, let % continue to denote
these larger preferences. For purposes of comparison, it is convenient to denote each element of
4 (I  X ), in the form  z; (`i)i2I where z 2 4 (I) is the marginal on the identities and each
`i 2 4 (X ) is the outcome lottery conditional on identity i obtaining. Thus (`i)i2I is a vector of
conditional outcome lotteries. Notice that, in this larger setting, the impartial observer imagines
each individual having his own personal outcome lottery.
In this setting, the analog of our independence over identity lotteries axiom for the impartial
observer is:
Constrained Independence over Identity Lotteries (for the Impartial Observer). Suppose
(z; (`i)i2I), (z
0; (`0i)i2I) 2 4 (I  X ) are such that (z; (`i)i2I)  (z0; (`0i)i2I). Then, for
all ~z, ~z0 2 4(I): (~z; (`i)i2I) % (~z0; (`0i)i2I) if and only if (~z + (1  ) z; (`i)i2I) %
(~z0 + (1  ) z0; (`0i)i2I) for all  in (0; 1].
This is the independence axiom suggested by Karni & Safra (2000).
Constrained independence over identity lotteries is weaker than Harsanyis independence axiom
in that it only applies to mixtures of identity lotteries. That is, like our independence axiom for
the impartial observer, constrained independence over identity lotteries is independence for the
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impartial observer over the lotteries that she faces directly namely, identity lotteries holding the
vector of conditional outcome lotteries xed. Notice, however, that each resolution of the identity
lottery yields not just a di¤erent identity but also a di¤erent outcome lottery. This extends the
bite of the axiom to the larger space 4 (I  X ). When restricted to the set of product lotteries,
4 (I)4 (X ), conditional independence reduces to our independence axiom over identity lotteries.
The following axiom (also from Karni & Safra (2000)) is a slight strengthening of Harsanyis
acceptance axiom.
Acceptance* Principle. For all i in I, all (`1; : : : ; `i; : : : ; `I) in 4 (X )I and `0i in 4 (X ),
`i %i `0i if and only if (i; (`1; : : : ; `i; : : : ; `I)) %(i; (`1; : : : ; `0i; : : : ; `I)).
The motivation for this axiom is the same as that for Harsanyis axiom. The slight additional
restriction is that, if the impartial observer knows that she will assume individual is identity, she
does not care about the (possibly di¤erent) conditional outcome lottery that she would have faced
had she assumed some other identity.
If we replace our independence and acceptance axioms with these axioms, then our gener-
alized utilitarian representation theorem holds exactly as stated in theorem 1 except that the
representation becomes
V
 
z; (`i)i2I

=
X
i
zii (Ui (`i)) . (3)
That is, each individual has a personal conditional outcome lottery `i in place of the common
outcome lottery `. The proof is essentially the same as that of theorem 1.17 Moreover, proposition
2, theorem 3, proposition 5 and their corollaries all continue to hold (with the same modication
about personal outcome lotteries) by the same proofs.18 Thus, if we extend the analogs of our
axioms to Harsanyis setting 4 (I  X ), we get essentially the same results.
17 See the supplementary appendix. Alternatively, this generalized utilitarian representation could be obtained
as a corollary of theorem 1 in Karni & Safra (2000).
18 Corollary 4 also holds without this modication, and we can also obtain stronger versions of outcome inde-
pendence.
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6.2 Harsanyis independence axiom restricted to product lotteries.
Conversely, now consider the restriction of Harsanyis independence axiom to our setting, 4 (I)
4 (X ). In this setting, the analog of Harsanyis axiom is to apply independence to all mixtures that
are well-dened in the set of product lotteries.19 To understand how Harsanyis independence
relates to the axioms in this paper and hence to see how Harsanyi implicitly imposes each of
those axioms it helps to unpack Harsanyis independence axiom into three axioms each associated
with the type of mixture to which it applies. First, Harsanyis independence axiom restricted to
product lotteries implies our independence over identity lotteries for the impartial observer. This
independence axiom is also satised by our generalized utilitarian impartial observer. Second,
it implies independence over outcome lotteries, imposed directly on the impartial observer not
just derived via acceptance from the preferences of the individuals. This independence axiom
immediately implies indi¤erence between individuals facing similar risks.
Third, the restriction of Harsanyis axiom also forces the impartial observer to apply indepen-
dence to hybrid mixtures.
Independence over Hybrid Lotteries (for the Impartial Observer). Suppose (z; `), (z0; `0)
2 4 (I) 4 (X ) are such that (z; `)  (z0; `0). Then for all ~z 2 4(I) and all ~`0 2 4(X ):
(~z; `) % (resp. -) (z0; ~`0) if and only if (~z + (1  ) z; `) % (resp. -) (z0; ~`0 + (1  a) `0)
for all  in (0; 1].
In this axiom the lotteries being mixed on the left are identity lotteries (holding outcome lotteries
xed), while the lotteries being mixed on the right are outcome lotteries (holding identity lotter-
ies xed). This independence axiom immediately implies indi¤erence between life chances and
accidents of birth.
It follows from theorem 1 that, given absence of unanimity and acceptance, the rst and third
implication of Harsanyis independence axiom when restricted to our setting,4 (I)4 (X )  i.e.,
identity and hybrid independence  are enough to yield Harsanyis conclusion, utilitarianism.20
19 This is the approach of Safra & Weissengrin (2002) who adapt Fishburns (1982, chapter 7) work on product
spaces of mixture sets.
20 Given all three implications of Harsanyis independence axiom (i.e., including outcome independence), we can
dispense with absence of unanimity: see Safra & Weissengrin (2002).
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6.3 Independence along both margins.
A natural question is whether we can replace hybrid independence with outcome independence in
the statement above: that is, whether acceptance and both identity and outcome independence
are enough to induce utilitarianism. We have argued in this paper that outcome independence is a
strong assumption in the context of the impartial observer: it directly imposes independence over
lotteries that she does not face directly, and by so doing implies much more than simply imposing
independence on the individuals and acceptance on the impartial observer. Nevertheless, one
might prefer such an axiomatization to using hybrid independence. First, hybrid independence
might seem the least natural of the three implications of Harsanyis independence axiom for
product lotteries. Both outcome and identity independence only involve mixing one margin at a
time. Second, an impartial observer might satisfy identity and outcome independence because she
views the two types of randomization symmetrically if independence applies to one margin then
perhaps it should apply to the other without taking a direct position on whether the two types
of randomization are equivalent.
It turns out, however, that identity independence, outcome independence and acceptance are
not enough to induce utilitarianism. In fact, we can see this using the example in the introduction.
Once again, suppose that there are two individuals, i and j, and two states, xi and xj , denoting
which agent is given a (possibly indivisible) good. As before, suppose that the impartial observers
preferences satisfy (i; xi)  (j; xj) and (i; xj)  (j; xi). Suppose that both individuals satisfy
independence. Specically, for any outcome lottery `, player is expected utility is given by
Ui (`) = ` (xi)   ` (xj) and player js expected utility is given by Uj (`) = ` (xj)   ` (xi). Let the
impartial observers preferences be given by the generalized utilitarian representation V (z; `) :=
zi [Ui (`)] + zj [Uj (`)] where the (common) -function is given by:
 [u] =
8>><>>:
uk for u  0
  ( u)k for u < 0
, for some k > 0.
Since these preferences are generalized utilitarian, by theorem 1, they satisfy acceptance and
identity independence. And since the -function is common, by proposition 6, they satisfy in-
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di¤erence between individuals facing similar risks. It is less obvious that they satisfy outcome
independence but this is shown in the supplementary appendix.
These preferences even have the property (similar to utilitarianism) that if the impartial ob-
server thinks she is equally likely to be either person, she is indi¤erent who gets the good. But
these preferences do not satisfy utilitarianism unless k = 1. To see this, notice that these prefer-
ences fail indi¤erence between life chances and accidents of birth. For example, we have (i; xi) 
(j; xj), but (i; xi + (1  )xj)  ( [i] + (1  ) [j] ; xi) except in the special case when  = 12 .
Nevertheless, the conjecture that independence along both margins implies utilitarianism is
close to correct. Grant et al (2009: Theorem 7) show that, if there are three or more agents,
under some richness conditions on the preferences, the combination of identity independence,
outcome independence and acceptance do imply utilitarianism.
7 Knowledge, Agreement and Welfare
Two questions gure prominently in the debates on the impartial observer theorem. First, what
is it that an individual imagines and knows when she imagines herself in the role of the impartial
observer. Second, must all potential impartial obsevers agree in their preferences over extended
lotteries. In this section, we consider four (of many) possible views on these questions and show
how they relate to the issues of this paper: concern about di¤erent risk attitudes (loosely, does the
impartial observer use a common -function); and concern about fairness (loosely, is her common
-function a¢ ne).21
In one view of the impartial observer, she simply imagines being in the physical circumstances
of person i or j facing the outcome lottery ` or `0.22 In this view, often associated with Vickrey
(1945), the impartial observer does not attempt to imagine having person is or js preferences.
In the context of our example, the impartial observer simply imagines herself having some chance
of getting the indivisible good, and applies her own preferences about such outcome lotteries.
Compared to other views, this approach does not require as much imagination or knowledge on
21 The following builds especially on Weymark (1991) and Mongin (2001). For other views see for example
dAspremont & Mongin (1998).
22 Pattanaik (1968, p. 1155) and Harsanyi (1977, p. 52) refer to these as objective positions.
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behalf of the impartial observer. In particular, she need not know is or js preferences. If the
impartial observer adopts this approach, loosely speaking, we get a common -function for free:
the utilities in its domain are all utilities of the same agent, the impartial observer. The -function
need not be a¢ ne however since the impartial observer might still, for example, prefer outcome to
identity lotteries. In this approach, there is no reason to expect all impartial observers to agree.
For example, di¤erent potential impartial observers will generally have di¤erent preferences over
physical outcome lotteries. This approach does not attempt to follow the acceptance principle.
Individualspreferences over outcome lotteries (other than those of the impartial observer) play
no role.
In a second view (the view taken in this paper), the impartial observer imagines not only
being in the physical circumstances of person i or j but also adopting what Pattanaik (1968, p.
1155) calls the subjective features of the respective individuals. Arrow (1963, p. 114, 1977)
calls this extended sympathybut it is perhaps better to use Harsanyis own term, imaginative
empathy:
This must obviously involve [her] imagining [her]self to be placed in individual is
objective position, i.e., to be placed in the objective positions (e.g., income, wealth,
consumption level, state of health, social position) that i would face in social situation
x. But it must also involve assessing these objective conditions in terms of is own
subjective attitudes and personal preferences ... rather than assessing them in terms
of [her] own subjective attitudes and personal preferences. [Harsanyi, 1977, p. 52:
notation changed to ours but emphasis in the original]23
This approach requires more imagination and knowledge by the impartial observer; in particular,
she is assumed to know the preferences of each individual over outcome lotteries and, by accep-
tance, to adopt these preferences when facing outcome lotteries as that individual. Knowledge and
acceptance of individual preferences implies agreement across all potential impartial observers in
23 Rawls also appeals to such imaginative empathy: A competent judge ... must not consider his own de facto
preferences as the necessarily valid measure of the actual worth of those interests which come before him, but ... be
both able and anxious to determine, by imaginative appreciation, what those interests mean to persons who share
them, and to consider them accordingly.(Rawls 1951, p. 179 quoted in Pattanaik 1968, p. 1157-8). See also Sens
(1979) behavioral and introspective bases for interpersonal comparisons of welfare.
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ranking pairs of the form (i; `) and (i; `0). But, as Broome (1993) and Mongin (2001) have pointed
out (and as Harsanyi (1977, p. 57) himself concedes), it does not imply agreement in ranking
pairs of the form (i; `) and (j; `0) where i 6= j. For example, each impartial observer can have her
own rankings across otherssubjective and objective positions.
Moreover, unlike in the Vickrey view above, a generalized utilitarian impartial observer in this
setting need not use a common -function across all individuals. To see this, let us extend the
example from the introduction by allowing the good being allocated to be divisible. Suppose that
an impartial observers own interpersonal assessments are such that she is indi¤erent between
being person i with share s of the good and being person j with the same share s of the good.
Suppose that for person i, the outome lottery 12xi +
1
2xj in which he has a half chance of getting
the whole good is indi¤erent to getting half the good for sure, but for person j this same lottery is
indi¤erent to getting one third of the good for sure. Combining acceptance with her interpersonal
assessments, the impartial observer must prefer facing this outcome lottery as person i. But,
by proposition 6, this contradicts using a common -function (and in particular, not all the i-
functions can be a¢ ne).
A third, more welfarist view goes beyond the assumptions of this paper. Suppose that, when
an impartial observer imagines being person i facing outcome lottery `, she knows the (ex ante)
welfare that i attains from this lottery. That is, suppose that each person i has a commonly
known welfare functionwi :  (X ) ! R. If we assume what Weymark (1991) calls congruence
between welfare and preference that is, ` %i `0 if and only if wi (`)  wi (`0) then this implies,
as before, that the impartial observer knows person is preferences. But now suppose further
that these welfares functions are at least ordinally measurable and fully comparable, and that
the impartial observer satises the rule: (i; `) % (j; `0) if and only if wi (`)  wj (`0). This extra
assumption implies acceptance, but it is stronger. It implies that all potential impartial observers
must agree in ranking pairs of the form (i; `) and (j; `0).
Nevertheless, a generalized utilitarian impartial observer in this setting still need not use a
common -function across all individuals. The example above still applies. The wi () functions
can encode the impartial observers assessment about being indi¤erent between being i or j with
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the same share s of the good; and they can encode i and js di¤erent certainty equivalents. Again,
this forces i and j to di¤er (and at least one to be non-a¢ ne).
Moreover, these welfarist assumptions still do not imply full agreement across potential im-
partial observers. All impartial observers must agree in the ranking of extended lotteries in which
they know for sure which identity they will assume, but they can still di¤er in their ranking of
general extended lotteries of the form (z; `) and (z0; `0). For example, di¤erent impartial observers
might have di¤erent preferences between outcome and identity lotteries. And/or each impartial
observer can have her own risk attitude in facing identity lotteries, reected in her own set of
i-functions. That is, even with these extreme assumptions, di¤erent impartial observers with
di¤erent risk attitudes will make di¤erent social choices.
To get beyond this conclusion, a fourth view simply assumes that each potential impartial
observers von Neumann-Morgenstern utility V (i; `) from the extended lottery (i; `) is equal to
the commonly known (fully comparable) welfare wi (`) which in turn is equal to individual is von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility Ui (`).24 In this case, all attitudes toward similar risks are the same;
in particular, the preferences of the impartial observer and the individuals i and j in the example
above can no longer apply. With this strong identication assumption, we nally get both an a¢ ne
common -function (i.e., utilitarianism) and agreement among all potential impartial observers,
but this approach seems a few assumptions beyond Harsanyis claim to have derived utilitarianism
from Bayesian rationality alone.
A Appendix: Proofs
We rst establish some lemmas that will be useful in the proofs that follow.
The rst lemma shows that, given absence of unanimity, we need at most two outcome lotteries,
`1 and `2, to coverthe entire range of the impartial observers preferences in the following sense:
for all product lotteries (z; `) either (z; `)   z0; `1 for some z0, or (z; `)  (z00; `2) for some z00, or
both. Moreover the set of product lotteries for which bothapplies are not all indi¤erent.
To state this more formally, let the outcome lotteries `1; `2 (not necessarily distinct) and
24 This identication is at the heart of the debate between Harsanyi and Sen. See Weymark (1991).
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identity lotteries z1; z2 (not necessarily distinct) be such that
 
z1; `1
  (z2; `2) and such that 
z1; `1

% (z; `) % (z2; `2) for all product lotteries (z; `). That is, the product lottery
 
z1; `1

is
weakly better than all other product lotteries, and the product lottery (z2; `2) is weakly worse than
all other product lotteries. And let the identity lotteries z1 and z2 (not necessarily distinct) be such
that
 
z1; `1

%
 
z; `1

%
 
z1; `
1

for all product lotteries
 
z; `1

, and
 
z2; `2

% (z; `2) % (z2; `2) for
all product lotteries (z; `2). That is, given outcome lottery `1, the identity lottery z1 is (weakly)
worse than all other identity lotteries; and, given outcome lottery `2, the identity lottery z2 is
(weakly) better than all other identity lotteries. The existence of these special lotteries follows
from continuity of %, non-emptyness of ; and the compactness of (I)(X ). Moreover, by
independence over identity lotteries, we can take z1; z1; z2; and z2 each to be a degenerate identity
lottery. Let these be i1; i1; i2; and i2 respectively.
Lemma 7 (Spanning) Assume absence of unanimity applies and that the impartial observer
satises acceptance and independence over identity lotteries. Let i1; i1; i2; i2; `1; and `2 be dened
as above. Then (a) either
 
i1; `
1
  (i2; `2), or  i2; `2   i1; `1, or  i2; `2   i1; `1. And (b),
for any product lottery (z; `), either
 
i1; `1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; `
1

or
 
i2; `2

% (z; `) % (i2; `2) or both.
Proof. (a) If `1 = `2, then the rst two cases both hold. Otherwise, suppose that the rst two
cases do not hold; that is,
 
i1; `
1
  (i2; `2) and  i1; `1   i2; `2. By the denition of i1, we know
that
 
i2; `
1

%
 
i1; `
1

, and hence
 
i2; `
1
  (i2; `2). Using absence of unanimity and acceptance ,
there must exist another individual {^ 6= i2 such that (^{; `2) 
 
{^; `1

. Again by the denition of i1,
we know that
 
{^; `1

%
 
i1; `
1

, and hence (^{; `2) 
 
i1; `
1

. By the denition of i2, we know that 
i2; `2

% (^{; `2), and hence
 
i2; `2
   i1; `1, as desired. Part (b) follows immediately from (a).

The next lemma does not yet impose independence over outcome lotteries on individuals and
hence yields a more general representation than that in theorem 1. The idea for this lemma comes
from Karni & Safra (2000) but they work with the full set of joint distributions4 (I  X ) whereas
we are restricted to the set of product lotteries 4 (I)4 (X ).
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Lemma 8 (A¢ ne Representation) Suppose absence of unanimity applies. Then the impartial
observer satises the acceptance principle and independence over identity lotteries if and only
if there exist a continuous function V : 4 (I)  4 (X ) ! R that represents %, and, for each
individual i in I, a function Vi : 4 (X )! R, that represents %i, such that for all (z; `) in 4 (I)
4 (X ),
V (z; `) =
IX
i=1
ziVi(`): (4)
Moreover the functions Vi are unique up to common positive a¢ ne transformations.
Proof . Since the representation is a¢ ne in identity lotteries, it is immediate that the represented
preferences satisfy the axioms. We will show that the axioms imply the representation.
Let i1; i1; i2; i2; `1; and `2 be dened as in lemma 7 above. Given continuity, an immediate
consequence of lemma 7 is that, for any product lottery (z; `), either (z; `)   z0; `1 for some z0,
or (z; `)  (z00; `2) for some z00 or both. Moreover, we can choose the z0 such that its support only
contains individuals i1 and i1. And similarly for z00 with respect to i2 and i2.
The proof of lemma now proceeds with two cases.
Case (1) The easiest case to consider is where `1 = `2. In this case,
 
i1; `1
   i1; `1, and 
i1; `1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; `
1

, for all (z; `). Then, for each (z; `), let V (z; `) be dened by
 
V (z; `)

i1

+ (1  V (z; `)) [i1] ; `1
  (z; `) :
By continuity and independence over identity lotteries, such a V (z; `) exists and is unique.
To show that this representation is a¢ ne, notice that if
 
V (z; `)

i1

+ (1  V (z; `)) [i1] ; `1
 
(z; `) and
 
V (z0; `)

i1

+ (1  V (z0; `)) [i1] ; `1
  (z0; `) then independence over identity lotteries
implies ([V (z; `) + (1  )V (z0; `)] i1+[1 V (z; `) (1  )V (z0; `)] [i1] ; `1)  (z + (1  ) z0; `).
Hence V (z; `) + (1  )V (z0; `) = V (z + (1  ) z0; `).
Since any identity lottery z in (I) can be written as z = Pi zi [i], proceeding sequentially
on I, a¢ nity implies V (z; `) = Pi ziV (i; `). Finally, by acceptance, V (i; ) agrees with %i on
(X ). Hence, if we dene Vi :  (X ) ! R by Vi (`) = V (i; `), then Vi represents individual is
preferences. The uniqueness argument is standard: see for example, Karni & Safra (2000, p. 321).
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Case (2). If
 
i1; `
1
  (i2; `2) then  i1; `1 % (z; `) %  i1; `1 for all (z; `) and hence case (1)
applies. Similarly, if
 
i2; `2
   i1; `1 then  i2; `2 % (z; `) % (i2; `2) for all (z; `), and again case
(1) applies (with `2 in place of `1). Hence suppose that
 
i1; `1
   i2; `2 and that  i1; `1 
(i2; `2). Then, by lemma 7,
 
i1; `1
   i2; `2   i1; `1  (i2; `2); that is, we have two overlapping
intervals that spanthe entire range of the impartial observers preferences.
Then, just as in case (1), we can construct an a¢ ne function V 1(; ) to represent the impartial
observers preferences % restricted to those (z; `) such that
 
i1; `1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; `
1

, and we can
construct an a¢ ne function V 2(; ) to represent % restricted to those (z; `) such that  i2; `2 %
(z; `) % (i2; `2). We can then apply an a¢ ne re-normalization of either V1 or V2 such the (re-
normalized) representations agree on the overlap
 
i2; `2

% (z; `) %
 
i1; `
1

. Since V1(; ) and
V2(; ) are a¢ ne, the re-normalized representation is a¢ ne, and induction on I (plus acceptance)
gives us V (z; `) =
P
i ziVi (`) as before. Again, uniqueness follows from standard arguments. 
Remark. The argument in case (1) above is similar to that in Safra & Weisengrin (2003, p. 184)
and Karni & Safra (2000, p. 320) except that, in the latter case, the analog of `1 is a vector of
outcome lotteries, with a di¤erent outcome lottery for each agent. Both these papers use stronger
axioms to obtain a unique representation when case (1) does not apply. Our argument for these
cases applies lemma 7 which in turn uses the richness condition, absence of unanimity, in place of
any stronger axiom on the preferences of the impartial observer.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Generalized Utilitarianism): It is immediate that the represented
preferences satisfy the axioms. We will show that the axioms imply the representation. If we
add to lemma 8 (the a¢ ne representation lemma) the assumption that each individual satises
independence over outcome lotteries, then it follows immediately that each Vi-function in repre-
sentation (4) must be a strictly increasing transformation, i, of a von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected-utility representation, Ui. Thus, we obtain a generalized utilitarian representation. 
Proof of Proposition 2 (Concavity) For each i in I, set Vi (`) := V (i; `) = i [Ui(`)] for all
`. That is, these are the Vis from the a¢ ne representation in lemma 8. Since each Ui is a¢ ne in
outcome lotteries, each V (i; ) is concave in outcome lotteries if and only if the corresponding i
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is concave.
To show that concavity is su¢ cient, suppose (z; `0)  (z0; `). Using the representation in
lemma 8 and imposing concavity, we obtain V (z; `+ (1  ) `0) =PIi=1 ziVi(`+ (1  ) `0) =PI
i=1 ziV (i; ` + (1  ) `0) 
PI
i=1 zi[V (i; `) + (1  )V (i; `0)] = V (z; `) + (1  )V (z; `0).
Using the fact that (z; `0)  (z0; `), the last expression is equal to V (z; `) + (1  )V (z0; `) =
V (z + (1  ) z0; `). Hence the impartial observer exhibits a preference for life chances.
For necessity, we need to show that for all i and all `, `0 2 4 (X ), V (i; ` + (1  ) `0) 
V (i; `) + (1  )V (i; `0) for all  in [0; 1]. So let % exhibit preference for life chances, x i and
consider `, `0 2 4 (X ). Assume rst that ` i `0. By acceptance, V (i; `) = V (i; `0). Hence, by
preference for life chances,
V (i; `+ (1  ) `0)
 V ( [i] + (1  ) [i] ; `) (by preference for life chances)
= V (i; `)
= V (i; `) + (1  )V (i; `0) (since V (i; `) = V (i; `0)),
as desired.
Assume henceforth that ` i `0 (and, by acceptance, V (i; `) > V (i; `0)). By absence of una-
nimity, there must exist a j such that V (j; `) < V (j; `0). There are three cases to consider.
(a) If V (i; `0)  V (j; `) then, by the representation in lemma 8, there exists z0 (of the form
 [i] + (1  ) [j]) such that V (z0; `) = V (i; `0). Thus, for all  in (0; 1),
V (i; `+ (1  ) `0)
 V ( [i] + (1  ) z0; `) (by preference for life chances)
= V (i; `) + (1  )V (z0; `)
= V (i; `) + (1  )V (i; `0) (since V (z0; `) = V (i; `0)),
as desired.
Assume henceforth that V (j; `) > V (i; `0) (which implies V (j; `0) > V (i; `0)).
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(b) If V (j; `0)  V (i; `) then, by the representation in lemma 8, there exists z (of the form
 [i] + (1  ) [j]) such that V (z; `0) = V (i; `). Thus, for all  in (0; 1),
V (i; `0 + (1  ) `)
 V ( [i] + (1  ) z; `0) (by preference for life chances)
= V (i; `0) + (1  )V (z; `0)
= V (i; `0) + (1  )V (i; `) (since V (z; `0) = V (i; `) ),
as desired.
(c) Finally, let V (i; `) > V (j; `0) > V (j; `) > V (i; `0). By the continuity of V , there exist 0; 0
in (0; 1) such that 0 > 0, and such that V (i; 
0` +
 
1  0 `0) = V (j; `0) and V (i; 0` +
(1  0) `0) = V (j; `). Denote `0 = 0`+ (1  0) `0. Then, similarly to part (a),
Vi(`+ (1  ) `0)  Vi (`) + (1  )Vi (`0)
for all  2 (0; 1). Next, denote `0 = 0`+  1  0 `0. Then, similarly to part (b),
Vi(`
0 + (1  ) `0)  Vi (`0) + (1  )Vi
 
`0

for all  2 (0; 1). Therefore, restricted to the line segment [`0; `], the graph of Vi lies weakly
above the line connecting (`0; Vi (`0)) and
 
`0; Vi
 
`0

(as does the point (`0; Vi (`0))) and weakly
above the line connecting (`0; Vi (`0)) and (`; Vi (`)) (as does the point
 
`0; Vi
 
`0

). Hence,
Vi(`+ (1  ) `0)  Vi (`) + (1  )Vi (`0) for all  2 (0; 1). 
Proof of Theorem 3 (Utilitarianism): It is immediate that the represented preferences satisfy
the axioms. We will show that the axioms imply the representation. Given acceptance, the proof
of proposition 2 (concavity) shows that the impartial observer satises preference for life chances
if and only if, each Vi in the representation in lemma 8 is concave in outcome lotteries. Notice,
in particular, that this argument never uses the fact that each individual satises independence
over outcome lotteries. By a similar argument, the impartial observer is indi¤erent between life
chances and accidents of birth if and only if each Vi is a¢ ne in outcome lotteries. To complete
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the representation, for each i, set Ui ()  Vi () to obtain the required von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected-utility representation of individual is preferences %i. 
Proof of Corollary 4 (Outcome Independence). This result can be obtained as a corollary
of theorem 3 (Utilitarianism I). Alternatively, the proof of proposition 2 (concavity) shows that
the impartial observer is indi¤erent between life chances and accidents of birth if and only if,
for all i in I, V (i; ) is a¢ ne in outcome lotteries. Using the representation in lemma 8, we
obtain V (z; `+ (1  ) `0) =PIi=1 ziV (i; `+(1  ) `0) =PIi=1 zi[V (i; `)+(1  )V (i; `0)] =
V (z; `) + (1  )V (z; `0). That is, the impartial observer is a¢ ne in outcome lotteries. Hence
it follows that the impartial observer satises independence over outcome lotteries. 
Proof of Proposition 5 (Di¤erent Risk Attitudes). First, notice that if Uji is not empty
then it is a closed interval. If Uji has an empty interior then the proposition holds trivially true.
Therefore, assume that Uji = [uji; uji] where uji < uji.
To prove that  1i  j convex is su¢ cient, x `; `0; ~` and ~`0 such that V (i; `) = V (j; `0) and
V

i; ~`

= V

j; ~`0

. We want to show that V

i; ~`+ (1  ) `

 V

j; ~`0 + (1  ) `0

. By
construction, both Uj (`0) and Uj

~`0

lie in Uji. Moreover, we have Ui (`) =  1i  j [Uj (`0)] and
Ui

~`

=  1i  j
h
Uj

~`0
i
. Applying the representation we obtain,
V

i; ~`+ (1  ) `

= i
h
Ui

~`+ (1  ) `
i
(by the representation)
= i
h
Ui

~`

+ (1  )Ui (`)
i
(by a¢ nity of Ui)
= i
h
 1i  j
h
Uj

~`0
i
+ (1  ) 1i  j [Uj (`0)]
i
(by the representation)
 i
h
 1i  j
h
Uj

~`0

+ (1  )Uj (`0)
ii
(by convexity of  1i  j)
= j
h
Uj

~`0 + (1  ) `0
i
(by a¢ nity of Uj)
= V

j; ~`0 + (1  ) `0

(by the representation)
To prove that  1i  j convex is necessary, x v,w in Uji. By the denition of Uji, there exist
outcome lotteries `; `0 2 4 (X ) such that Uj (`0) = v and Ui (`) =  1i  j (v); and there exist
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outcome lotteries ~`; ~`0 2 4 (X ) such that Uj

~`0

= w and Ui

~`

=  1i j (w). By construction,
we have V (i; `) = V (j; `0) and V

i; ~`

= V

j; ~`0

. Therefore, for all  in (0; 1)
i
h
Ui

~`+ (1  ) `
i
 j
h
Uj

~`0 + (1  ) `0
i
)
Ui

~`

+ (1  )Ui (`)   1i  j
h
Uj

~`0

+ (1  )Uj (`0)
i
)
 1i  j (w) + (1  ) 1i  j (v)   1i  j (w + (1  ) v)
Since v and w were arbitrarily, the last inequality corresponds to the convexity of  1i j on Uji.

Proof of Proposition 6 (Common -function) . Necessity follows immediately from propo-
sition 5. For the su¢ ciency argument, rst x a representation

fUi; igi2I of the preferences of
the generalized utilitarian impartial observer. Recall that, by theorem 1, the composite functions
i  Ui are unique up to a common positive a¢ ne transformation. The argument proceeds by a
series of steps to construct a new representation
n
U^i; ^i
o
i2I

with ^i   for all i in I. The
construction leaves the composite functions unchanged; that is, i Ui    U^i for all i. To start,
let the outcome lottery `1 and the individual i1 be such that
 
i1; `1

% (j; `0) for all individuals
j 2 I and outcome lotteries `0 in 4 (X ).
Step 1. Suppose there exists a second individual j such that the interval Uji1 has a non-empty
interior. By Proposition 5, if the impartial observer is indi¤erent between facing similar risks as
i1 or j, then  1i1  j is a¢ ne on Uji1 . Since Uji1 has a non-empty interior,  1i1  j has a unique
a¢ ne extension on R. Dene a new von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U^j for agent j by
the a¢ ne transformation, U^j (`) := 
 1
i1 j [Uj (`)] for all ` in4 (X ). Dene a new transformation
function ^j for agent j by setting ^j

U^j (`)

:= j (Uj (`)). Thus, in particular, if (i
1; `)  (j; `0)
(and hence j [Uj (`
0)] = i1 [Ui1 (`)]), then by construction we have U^j (`
0) = Ui1 (`). Moreover,
by construction, we have ^j (u) = i1 (u) for all u in the intersection of the ranges Ui (4 (X )) \
U^j (4 (X )). Hence, with slight abuse of notation we can write  := ^j = i1 , even if this extends
the domain of i1 . Thus, we can construct a new generalized utilitarian representation of the
same preferences with Uj replaced by U^j and j replaced by  in which the two individuals i
1 and
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j share a common . Uniqueness of the Ui up to common positive a¢ ne transformations holds
because, by construction, (i1; `)  (j; `0) implies Ui1 (`) = U^j (`0).
Step 2. By repeating step 1, for any individual j0 in I such that there exists a sequence of
individuals j1 : : : jN with j1 = i1 and jN = j0 such that Ujnjn 1 has non-empty interior, we can
construct a new generalized utilitarian representation in which the two individuals i1 and j0 share
a common . Let I1 be the set of individuals who can be connected to i1 in this manner. If
I1 = I, then we are done.
Step 3. Suppose then that InI1 is non-empty. By construction, (j; `00) % (j0; `0) for all `0; `00
in 4 (X ) and all j 2 I1 and j0 2 InI1. Let i0 2 InI1 and ^`2 4 (X ) be such that

i0; ^`

% (j0; `0)
for all individuals j0 2 InI1 and outcome lotteries `0 in 4 (X ). If (j; `00)  (i0; `) for some `; `00 in
4 (X ) and j 2 I1: let U^i0 be a positive a¢ ne transformation of Ui0 such that U^i0 (`) = Uj (`00),
and let ^i0 be such that ^i0  U^i0  i0  Ui0 . Then simply extend  on the range of U^i0 by setting
 := ^i0 . Conversely, if (j; `
00)  (i0; `) for all `; `00 in 4 (X ) and j 2 I1: let U^i0 be a positive a¢ ne
transformation of Ui0 such that U^i0 (`) < Uj (`00) for all `; `00 in 4 (X ) and j 2 I1, and let ^i0 be
such that ^i0  U^i0  i0  Ui0 . Again, extend  on the range of U^i0 by setting  := ^i0 .
Step 4. Repeat steps 1 and 2 using i0 in place of i1 and  in place of i1 . Let I2 be the set
of individuals who can be connected to i0 when step 2 is repeated. Notice that, by construction
I1 \ I2 is empty. If I1 [ I2 = I then we are done. If I1 [ I2 6= I then repeat step 3. Let i00 be
the individual in In  I1 [ I2 that corresponds to i0 in this step. Then repeat steps 1 and 2 using
i00 place of i. From the niteness of I, this process can be repeated only a nite number of times
before we exhaust I. 
B Supplementary Appendix:
This appendix contains two counter-examples mentioned in the text and also the key step to show
that the proof of theorem 1 extends to obtain the form of generalized utilitarian representation
given in expression (3) for preferences dened on 4 (I  X ) and the corresponding axioms as
given in section 6.
Examples. For each of the following examples, let I = f1; 2g and X= fx1; x2g. To simplify
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notation, for each z 2 4 (I), let q = z2; and for each ` 2 4 (X ) let p := `(x2). Then, with slight
abuse of notation, we write (q; p) % (q0; p0) for (z; `) % (z0; `0), and write V (q; p) for V (z; `).
Example 1 simply translates the example discussed in section 6 to show that the impartial
observer might satisfy acceptance, and both identity and outcome independence but not be utili-
tarian.
Example 1 Let agent 1s preferences be given by U1 (p) = (1  2p), and let agent 2s preferences
be given by U2 (p) = (2p  1). Let the impartial observers preferences be given by V (q; p) :=
(1  q) [U1 (p)] + q [U2 (p)], where the (common) -function is given by:
 [u] =

uk for u  0
  ( u)k for u < 0 , for some k > 0
Acceptance and identity independence were discussed in the text. To show that this example
satises outcome independence, consider the inverse function  1 (u) = u1=k for u  0 and
 1 (u) =   ( u)1=k for u < 0. This is a strictly increasing function. Therefore, the function
 1 [V (; )] represents the same preferences as V (; ).
It is enough to show that we can write
 1 [V (q; p)] = (1  p) 1 [(1  2q)] + p 1 [(2q   1)] :
This alternative representation is symmetric to the original representation V (; ) with the ps and
qs reversed and  1 replacing . Since the alternative representation is a¢ ne in p, preferences
must satisfy independence over outcome lotteries.
To conrm that  1 [V (; )] takes this form, it is instructive to rewrite V (q; p) as follows:
V (q; p) =
8>><>>:
(1  2q) (1  2p)k for p < 1=2
(2q   1) (2p  1)k for p > 1=2
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  2q) (1  2p)k for q < 1=2, p < 1=2 (and V (q; p) > 0)
  (2q   1) (1  2p)k for q > 1=2, p < 1=2 (and V (q; p) < 0)
0 for (2q   1) (2p  1) = 0
  (1  2q) (2p  1)k for q < 1=2, p > 1=2 (and V (q; p) < 0)
(2q   1) (2p  1)k for q > 1=2, p > 1=2 (and V (q; p) > 0)
.
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Hence,
 1  V (q; p) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  2q)1=k (1  2p) for q < 1=2, p < 1=2
  (2q   1)1=k (1  2p) for q > 1=2, p < 1=2
0 for (2q   1) (2p  1) = 0
  (1  2q)1=k (2p  1) for q < 1=2, p > 1=2
(2q   1)1=k (2p  1) for q > 1=2, p > 1=2
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1  p)
h
(1  2q)1=k
i
+ p
h
  [  (2q   1)]1=k
i
for q < 1=2
0 for q = 1=2
(1  p)
h
  [  (1  2q)]1=k
i
+ p
h
(2q   1)1=k
i
for q > 1=2
= (1  p) 1 [(1  2q)] + p 1 [(2q   1)]
which equals (1  p) 1 [(1  2q)] + p 1 [(2q   1)] as desired. 
Example 2 shows that the impartial observers preferences can satisfy all the conditions of
proposition 2 (the concavity result) except absence of unanimity and yet the functions i need
not be concave. That is, absence of unanimity is essential.
Example 2 Let the individuals preferences be given by U1 (p) = U2 (p) = p, and let the impartial
observers preferences be given by V (q; p) := (1  q)1 [U1 (p)] + q2 [U2 (p)] where
1 (u) :=

1=4 + u=2 for u  1=2
u for u > 1=2
2 (u) :=

u for u  1=2
2u  1=2 for u > 1=2
Since U1 = U2, both individuals have the same ranking over outcome lotteries and so the
impartial observers preferences violate absence of unanimity. Clearly, the functions 1 (:) and
2 (:) are not concave. To see that the impartial observer satises preference for life chances,
without loss of generality let p  p0 and notice that (q; p0)  (q0; p) implies either p  p0  1=2
or p0  p  1=2. But in either case, the functions 1 and 2 are concave (in fact, a¢ ne) on the
domain [p; p0] and hence V (q + (1  ) q0; p)  (in fact, =) V (q; p+ (1  ) p0), as desired. 
The generalized utilitarian representation for 4 (I  X ). We next show that we can
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use essentially the same proof as for theorem 1 to obtain the form of generalized utilitarian repre-
sentation given in expression (3) for an impartial observers preferences % dened on 4 (I  X )
that satisfy the axioms given in section 6. The key step is to show that the analog of lemma 7
(spanning) part (b) still applies: there exist two outcome lotteries `1 and `2 and four individuals
i1; i1; i
2; and i2 such that for any joint distribution
 
z; (`i)i2I

, either
 
i1; `1

%
 
z; (`i)i2I

% 
i1; `
1

or
 
i2; `2

%
 
z; (`i)i2I

% (i2; `2) or both. That is, we can still use two sets of product
lotteries, one associated with `1 and one with `2, to span the entire range of the the impartial
observers preferences even though these are now dened over the full set of joint distributions
4 (I  X ).
To see this, let (z^;

^`
i

i2I
) be an element of 4 (I  X ) with the property that (z^;

^`
i

i2I
) %
(z; (`i)i2I) for all (z; (`i)i2I) 2 4 (I  X ). By constrained independence, there must exist an
individual i1 in the support of z^ such that (i1;

^`
i

i2I
)  (z^;

^`
i

i2I
). Let `1 := ^`i1 , and let
 
i1; `1

denote the (product) lottery (i1; (`i)i2I) where `i = `
1 for all i 2 I. By the acceptance principle, 
i1; `1
  (i1;^`i
i2I
). Therefore, there exists an outcome lottery `1 and an individual i1 such
that the product lottery
 
i1; `1

has the property that
 
i1; `1

% (z; (`i)i2I) for all (z; (`i)i2I) 2
4 (I  X ). Similarly, there exists a outcome lottery `2 and an individual i2 such that the product
lottery (i2; `2) has the property that (z; (`i)i2I) % (i2; `2) for all (z; (`i)i2I) 2 4 (I  X ). Dene
i1 and i2 exactly as in lemma 7. The proof of part (a) of lemma 7 (spanning) then follows with no
change in the proof. And the analog of part (b) of the lemma (as stated above) follows immediately
from part (a).
Thereafter, the proof of the representation result is almost unchanged. The analog of lemma 8
obtains a a¢ ne representation of the form V (z; `) =
PI
i=1 ziVi(`i). The proof is the same as that
for lemma 8 except that constrained independence is used wherever independence over identity
lotteries was used before. This extends the representation from product lotteries 4 (I)4 (X )
to the full space of joint distributions 4 (I  X ). The fact that Vi(`i) takes the form i (Ui (`i))
follows (as before) from acceptance and outcome independence for individuals.
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